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# Anderson v. Creighton
[483 U.S. 635](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111953/anderson-v-creighton/?type=o\&q=\&type=o\&order_by=score%20desc\&stat_Precedential=on\&citation=483%20U.S.%20635) (1987)
Supreme Court of the United States
**Anderson**\
**v.**\
**Creighton**
## \[Majority Opinion]
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether a federal law enforcement officer who participates in a search that violates the Fourth Amendment may be held personally liable for money damages if a reasonable officer could have believed that the search comported with the Fourth Amendment.
## I \[Factual and Procedural Background]
Petitioner Russell Anderson is an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. On November 11, 1983, Anderson and other state and federal law enforcement officers conducted a warrantless search of the home of respondents, the Creighton family. The search was conducted because Anderson believed that Vadaain Dixon, a man suspected of a bank robbery committed earlier that day, might be found there. He was not.
The Creightons later filed suit against Anderson in a Minnesota state court, asserting among other things a claim for money damages under the Fourth Amendment \[...][1](#footnotes) After removing the suit to Federal District Court, Anderson filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing that the *Bivens* claim was barred by Anderson’s qualified immunity from civil damages liability. \[...] \[The District Court] granted summary judgment on the ground that the search was lawful, holding that the undisputed facts revealed that Anderson had had probable cause to search the Creighton’s home and that his failure to obtain a warrant was justified by the presence of exigent circumstances.
The Creightons appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which reversed. \[...] The Court of Appeals ... held that Anderson was not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, since the right Anderson was alleged to have violated — the right of persons to be protected from warrantless searches of their home unless the searching officers have probable cause and there are exigent circumstances — was clearly established. \[...]
Anderson filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred by refusing to consider his argument that he was entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds if he could establish as a matter of law that a reasonable officer could have believed the search to be lawful. \[...]
## II
### \[Discussion of the Legal Rules]
When government officials abuse their offices, “action\[s] for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees.” [*Harlow* v. *Fitzgerald*](#user-content-fn-1)[^1]. On the other hand, permitting damages suits against government officials can entail substantial social costs, including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties. \[...] Our cases have accommodated these conflicting concerns by generally providing government officials performing discretionary functions with a qualified immunity, shielding them from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated. See, *e. g.,* [*Malley* v. *Briggs*](#user-content-fn-2)[^2]*,* (qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”) ... Somewhat more concretely, whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the “objective legal reasonableness” of the action ... assessed in light of the legal rules that were “clearly established” at the time it was taken \[...].
The operation of this standard, however, depends substantially upon the level of generality at which the relevant “legal rule” is to be identified. For example, the right to due process of law is quite clearly established by the Due Process Clause, and thus there is a sense in which any action that violates that Clause (no matter how unclear it may be that the particular action is a violation) violates a clearly established right. Much the same could be said of any other constitutional or statutory violation. But if the test of “clearly established law” were to be applied at this level of generality, it would bear no relationship to the “objective legal reasonableness” ..*.* Plaintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified immunity that our cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights. \[...] Such an approach, in sum, would destroy “the balance that our cases strike between the interests in vindication of citizens’ constitutional rights and in public officials’ effective performance of their duties,” by making it impossible for officials “reasonably \[to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.” [*Davis*](#user-content-fn-3)[^3].[2](#footnotes) It should not be surprising, therefore, that our cases establish that the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been “clearly established” in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, see [*Mitchell*](#user-content-fn-4)[^4]; but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. See, *e. g.,* [*Malley*](#user-content-fn-5)[^5]; [*Mitchell*](#user-content-fn-6)[^6]; [*Davis*](#user-content-fn-7)[^7].
### \[Summary of Parties' Arguments & Preliminary Analysis]
Anderson contends that the Court of Appeals misapplied these principles. We agree. The Court of Appeals’ brief discussion of qualified immunity consisted of little more than an assertion that a general right Anderson was alleged to have violated — the right to be free from warrantless searches of one’s home unless the searching officers have probable cause and there are exigent circumstances — was clearly established. The Court of Appeals specifically refused to consider the argument that it was *not* clearly established that the circumstances with which Anderson was confronted did not constitute probable cause and exigent circumstances. \[...] We have recognized that it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and we have indicated that in such cases those officials — like other officials who act in ways they reasonably believe to be lawful — should not be held personally liable. See [*Malley*](#user-content-fn-5)[^5]. The same is true of their conclusions regarding exigent circumstances.
It follows from what we have said that the determination whether it was objectively legally reasonable to conclude that a given search was supported by probable cause or exigent circumstances will often require examination of the information possessed by the searching officials. But contrary to the Creightons’ assertion, this does not reintroduce into qualified immunity analysis the inquiry into officials’ subjective intent ... The relevant question in this case, for example, is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed Anderson’s warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed. Anderson’s subjective beliefs about the search are irrelevant.
The principles of qualified immunity that we reaffirm today require that Anderson be permitted to argue that he is entitled to summary judgment on the ground that, in light of the clearly established principles governing warrantless searches, he could, as a matter of law, reasonably have believed that the search of the Creightons’ home was lawful.[3](#footnotes)
## Ill \[Analysis]
In addition to relying on the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, the Creightons advance three alternative grounds for affirmance. \[...]
First, and most broadly, the Creightons argue that it is inappropriate to give officials alleged to have violated the Fourth Amendment — and thus necessarily to have *unreasonably* searched or seized — the protection of a qualified immunity intended only to protect reasonable official action. It is not possible, that is, to say that one “reasonably” acted unreasonably. The short answer to this argument is that it is foreclosed by the fact that we have previously extended qualified immunity to officials who were alleged to have violated the Fourth Amendment. \[...] The fact is that ... the precise content of most of the Constitution’s civil-liberties guarantees rests upon an assessment of what accommodation between governmental need and individual freedom is reasonable ... We have frequently observed, and our many cases on the point amply demonstrate, the difficulty of determining whether particular searches or seizures comport with the Fourth Amendment. \[...] Law enforcement officers whose judgments in making these difficult determinations are objectively legally reasonable should no more be held personally liable in damages than should officials making analogous determinations in other areas of law.
For the same reasons, we also reject the Creightons’ narrower suggestion that we overrule *Mitchell* (extending qualified immunity to officials who conducted warrantless wiretaps), by holding that qualified immunity may never be extended to officials who conduct unlawful warrantless searches.
Finally, we reject the Creightons’ narrowest and most Procrustean proposal: that no immunity should be provided to police officers who conduct unlawful warrantless searches of innocent third parties’ homes in search of fugitives. They rest this proposal on the assertion that officers conducting such searches were strictly liable at English common law if the fugitive was not present. \[...] Although it is true that we have observed that our determinations as to the scope of official immunity are made in the light of the “common-law tradition,”[4](#footnotes) ... we have never suggested that the precise contours of official immunity can and should be ... derived from the often arcane rules of the common law. That notion is plainly contradicted by *Harlow,* where the Court completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the common law, replacing the inquiry into subjective malice so frequently required at common law with an objective inquiry into the legal reasonableness of the official action. \[...]
The general rule of qualified immunity is intended to provide government officials with the ability “reasonably \[to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.” [*Davis*](#user-content-fn-8)[^8]. Where that rule is applicable, officials can know that they will not be held personally liable as long as their actions are reasonable in light of current American law. That security would be utterly defeated if officials were unable to determine whether they were protected by the rule without entangling themselves in the vagaries of the English and American common law. We are unwilling to Balkanize the rule of qualified immunity by carving exceptions at the level of detail the Creightons propose. We therefore decline to make an exception to the general rule of qualified immunity for cases involving allegedly unlawful warrantless searches of innocent third parties’ homes in search of fugitives.
For the reasons stated, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.[5](#footnotes)
*It is so ordered.*
***
#### Footnotes
1. The Creightons also named other defendants and advanced various other claims against both Anderson and the other defendants. Only the *Bivens* claim against Anderson remains at issue in this case, however.
2. The dissent, which seemingly would adopt this approach, seeks to avoid the unqualified liability that would follow by advancing the suggestion that officials generally (though not law enforcement officials, see *post,* at 654, 661-662, and officials accused of violating the Fourth Amendment, see *post,* at 659-667) be permitted to raise a defense of reasonable good faith, which apparently could be asserted and proved only at trial. See *post,* at 653. But even when so modified (and even for the fortunate officials to whom the modification applies) the approach would totally abandon the concern — which was the driving force behind Harlow’s substantial reformulation of qualified-immunity principles — that “insubstantial claims” against government officials be resolved prior to discovery and on summary judgment if possible. *Harlow,* 457 U. S., at 818-819. A passably clever plaintiff would always be able to identify an abstract clearly established right that the defendant could be alleged to have violated, and the good-faith defense envisioned by the dissent would be available only at trial.
3. The Creightons argue that the qualified immunity doctrine need not be expanded to apply to the circumstances of this case, because the Federal Government and various state governments have established programs through which they reimburse officials for expenses and liability incurred in suits challenging actions they have taken in their official capacities. Because our holding today does not extend official qualified immunity beyond the bounds articulated in *Harlow* and our subsequent cases, an argument as to why we should not do so is beside the point. Moreover, even assuming that conscientious officials care only about their personal liability and not the liability of the government they serve, the Creightons do not and could not reasonably contend that the programs to which they refer make reimbursement sufficiently certain and generally available to justify reconsideration of the balance struck in *Harlow* and subsequent cases. See [28 CFR § 50.15](https://cite.case.law/citations/?q=28%20C.F.R.%20%C2%A7%2050.15)(c) (1987) *(permitting* reimbursement of Department of Justice employees when the Attorney General finds reimbursement appropriate); 5 F. Harper, F. James, & O. Gray, Law of Torts § 29.9, n. 20 (2d ed. 1986) (listing various state programs).
4. Of course, it is the American rather than the English common-law tradition that is relevant, cf. *Malley,* [*supra,* ](https://cite.case.law/us/475/335/#p341)[at 340-342](https://cite.case.law/us/475/335/#p341); and the American rule appears to have been considerably less draconian than the English. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 204, 206 (1965) (officers with an arrest warrant are privileged to enter a third party’s house to effect arrest if they reasonably believe the fugitive to be there).
5. Noting that no discovery has yet taken place, the Creightons renew their argument that, whatever the appropriate qualified immunity standard, some discovery would be required before Anderson’s summary judgment motion could be granted. We think the matter somewhat more complicated. One of the purposes of the *Harlow* qualified immunity standard is to protect public officials from the “broad-ranging discovery” that can be “peculiarly disruptive of effective government.” 457 U. S., at 817 (footnote omitted). For this reason, we have emphasized that qualified immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of a litigation. *Id.,* at 818. See also *Mitchell* v. *Forsyth,* [472 U. S. 511](https://cite.case.law/us/472/511/#p528), 526 (1986). Thus, on remand, it should first be determined whether the actions the Creightons allege Anderson to have taken are actions that a reasonable officer could have believed lawful. If they are, then Anderson is entitled to dismissal prior to discovery. Cf. [*ibid.*](https://cite.case.law/us/472/511/#p528) If they are not, and if the actions Anderson claims he took are different from those the Creightons allege (and are actions that a reasonable officer could have believed lawful), then discovery may be necessary before Anderson’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds can be resolved. Of course, any such discovery should be tailored specifically to the question of Anderson’s qualified immunity.
***
Editorial Notes and Licensing
Editing to the original by Matthew L. Mac Kelly. Many of the court's original citations to authorities and other content may have been omitted for length and readability purposes. Many elisions of text are not identified, particularly string citations and original footnotes when not materially necessary to the purpose of this portion of the sourcebook. However, some elisions are identified by bracketed ellipses (e.g., \[...]).
Judicial decisions and annotations thereto by third parties are not subject to copyright protection and are in the public domain. *See, e.g., Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc*., [140 S. Ct. 1498](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8288711378870515248\&q=Georgia+et+al.+v.+Public.Resource.Org,+Inc.\&hl=en\&as_sdt=6,50) (2020).
Note: Hyperlinks within this case are not original. Some of these hyperlinks (such as cases and footnotes) may direct you to an external publicly accessible display of the case. This is helpful for reference purposes, and no copyright is claimed here over a third party's hyperlinking choices and methodologies, if applicable.
Subject to limitations above, if any, this page is in the public domain. [CC0 1.0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
[
](/learn/sourcebooks/cj-liability/unit-5-vicarious-liability-principles/clipper-v.-takoma-park.md)
[^1]: [457 U. S., at 814](https://cite.case.law/us/457/800/)
[^2]: [475 U. S. 335](https://cite.case.law/us/475/335/#p341), 341 (1986)
[^3]: at 195
[^4]: [*supra,* ](https://cite.case.law/us/472/511/#p528)[at 535, n. 12](https://cite.case.law/us/472/511/#p528)
[^5]: [*supra,* ](https://cite.case.law/us/475/335/#p341)[at 344-345](https://cite.case.law/us/475/335/#p341)
[^6]: [*supra,* ](https://cite.case.law/us/472/511/#p528)[at 528](https://cite.case.law/us/472/511/#p528)
[^7]: [*supra,* ](https://cite.case.law/us/468/183/#p191)[at 191, 195](https://cite.case.law/us/468/183/#p191)
[^8]: [468 U. S., at 195](https://cite.case.law/us/468/183/#p191)
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