> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://studies-de-jure.gitbook.io/learn/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://studies-de-jure.gitbook.io/learn/sourcebooks/cj-liability/unit-6-selected-topics-in-law-enforcement-liability/wilson-v.-city-of-lafayette/brief-wilson-v.-lafayette.md). # Brief—Wilson v. Lafayette **Facts** Detectives see Wilson near area known for growing marijuana; Wilson admits the plants are his and takes off running; foot chase 3/4 mi. Detectives call for help; responding officer seels Wilson running in a field; tries to cut off Wilson; identifies self and commands to stop - sees Wilson reach for pocket, officer tells him to get his hand away from his pocket, and Wilson ran again until approaching a fence. He slowed down, briefly turned toward the officer and reached for his pocket again, Wilson might have looked away like he was going to run, and Wilson fired his taser. Wilson fell to the ground. Officers found box cutter in the pocket and noticed Wilson was unresponsive. They couldn't revive him; whether it was the taser, a pre-existing heart condition, and/or exertion is disputed. **Immunity rule** 2-part test: (1) def violated const'l right; and (2) the violation was clearly established law at the time such as a reasonable officer would have known the conduct was illegal "Clearly established" - a plaintiff must direct this court "to cases from the Supreme Court, the relevant Circuit, or the weight of authority from other circuits ***Graham***** factors** excessive force claims we look to the totality of the circumstances and, in doing so, three considerations are often in play: "\[1] the severity of the crime at issue, \[2] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and \[3] whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." **Analysis** No previous has held tasers were excessive force when resisting arrest, including cases where the person was "suspected of innocuous crimes, posed little risk of escape and had not yet physically harmed anybody. (Wilson not suspected of violent crime, was likely to be apprehended, and hadn't harmed anyone) Different than plaintiff's cases cited: In [*Cavanaugh*](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5612010067898301943\&hl=en\&as_sdt=6,50)*,* for example, the court allowed a claim for excessive force but the plaintiff there hadn't attempted to evade law enforcement and quite clearly didn't possess any weapon. \[...] In [*Casey*](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6325210387493027828\&hl=en\&as_sdt=6,50)*,* we found excessive force only after the police tackled, tasered, and knocked to the ground a man peacefully attempting to return a file he had unlawfully taken from a courthouse. There was no felony (only a misdemeanor), no fleeing, no weapon, no refusal to obey police commands. \[...] There was no risk of flight or a potential weapon in [*Orem* ](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16566310593965203287\&hl=en\&as_sdt=6,50)either. \[...] And in [*Samples*](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8716919154892971666\&hl=en\&as_sdt=6,50)*,* it was disputed whether the plaintiff was fleeing and the force employed (six revolver shots) was undoubtedly deadly. \[...] Here, fleeing AND reached for pocket despite being warned against it (may have had a lethal weason) Whether tasing is excessive force isn't clearly established law (and 2 of 3 cases cited by plaintiff were after the incident) ***Graham*** **severity** - felony and not rebutted that training about marijuana growers tend to be armed and ready to use force **immediate threat?** - lethalness is debated but less than gunshot, but a probe to the head is more serious than not to the head; countervailing gov't interests - threat to officer safety: his pocket, no officers close enough to help. the situation was "replete with uncertainty" - even with box cutters, a reasonable officer could have feared for a lethal weapon **resisting** - he was resisting, running for a long distance rough terrain barbed wire, failing to stop despite repeated commands, and there was a second fench at which he hesitated, and then reached for pocket again despite warnings steps... ooking to the **circumstances as a whole**, then, the ***Graham***** factors prove indeterminate at bes**t. One might argue that, on balance, they favor Officer Harris. One might, perhaps with more difficulty, argue they tip in the Wilsons' favor. **But however viewed they do not *****clearly***** indicate Officer Harris's conduct was unlawful.** At qualified **immunity's second step, *****Graham***** cautions us to proceed "from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight**," taking account of "the fact that **police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving**."\[\*] the events happened as they did and they happened under highly tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving circumstances **without any *****clear***** direction in the law that might have warned Officer Harris his conduct was unlawful**. \[...] \[T]he Wilsons \[...] seek to make **much of the fact that Officer Harris "intentionally" or at least "recklessly**" aimed the taser at Mr. Wilson's "head."\[\*] But under long settled Fourth Amendment law, our analysis **may not be informed by the officer's subjective intent** or motives in deploying that force. Instead, our analysis must focus (as it has) on the question **whether the officer's actions were "\`objectively reasonable**' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting \[him], without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." [*Graham,* 490 U.S. at 397](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4306215806680760770\&hl=en\&as_sdt=6,50). In undertaking this assessment, **in asking about the objective reasonableness of the force used, we must and do view the facts from the "perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene," not from the subjective perspective of the officer involved.**[**\[\*\]**](#user-content-fn-1)[^1] That is the direction the Supreme Court and our precedents give us and which we must and do follow. MORE... {% embed url="" %} involves death (this case, Bradley) and another case below ([Wilson v. City of Lafayette](#wilson-v.-city-of-lafayette)) {% embed url="" %} THESE ARE JUST THE FACTS: Officer Casey Benton of the DeKalb County Police Department was patrolling near The Highlands of East Atlanta apartment complex in Atlanta, Georgia. That area had recently experienced a rise in gang-related and violent crime. Around 7:00 p.m., Officer Benton observed a white SUV with a temporary license plate leaving the apartment complex shortly after it had entered. He decided to follow. The SUV was driven by Wilford Sims and its lone passenger was Troy Robinson. Sims had bought it a few days earlier. Officer Benton later testified that he decided to follow the car because he could not see an expiration date on the temporary tag. While Officer Benton was following Sims's car, he looked at the temporary tag and ran the tag number in the police department's computer system. He does not recall the information that was returned by the computer system about the tag, nor did he check the system to see whether the tag was expired. Sims was not suspected of committing any other traffic violations. After about two minutes, Officer Benton stopped the SUV. Officer Benton asked for Sims's driver's license, and Sims provided it. Officer Benton then asked whether there were any weapons in the car. Sims advised Officer Benton that he was carrying a handgun. Officer Benton asked Sims to step out of the vehicle, and Sims complied. Officer Benton then retrieved a loaded handgun from the center console. Officer Benton told Sims that he could reenter the car, which he did. Officer Benton then asked Robinson if he had any identification. Robinson replied that he did not. There were two other officers on the scene: Officer C.M. Franklin and Officer L.O. Niemann. When Officer Benton asked one of them to run Robinson's name in the police department's system, Robinson abruptly exited the vehicle and fled on foot. Robinson ran across a road and through the parking lot of a Family Dollar store that abutted the apartment complex. Officer Benton pursued him on foot while Officer Niemann attempted to follow in his patrol car. Officer Franklin remained with Sims. At some point after Robinson reached the area behind the Family Dollar, Officer Benton fired a single shot from his taser without warning, striking Robinson. The ground behind the store slopes down toward a chain-link fence that, on the day of the chase, was surrounded by thick undergrowth. The fence stands several feet from an eight-foot-high concrete wall that lines the back of the Highlands apartment complex. By the time Robinson reached the chain-link fence, Officer Benton was still ten to fifteen feet behind him. Robinson went over the fence and tried to climb the concrete wall, fell off the wall, and suffered blunt force trauma to his head and neck that caused his death. [1237](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7633777718010484678\&q=bradley+v.+benton+20-11509\&hl=en\&as_sdt=6,50#p1237)[\*1237](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7633777718010484678\&q=bradley+v.+benton+20-11509\&hl=en\&as_sdt=6,50#p1237) Officer Benton testified that he fired his taser without warning while Robinson was still on the ground. As Officer Benton tells it, the taser did not affect Robinson because only one of the two taser probes pierced Robinson's skin, with the other getting stuck in Robinson's clothing. Consequently, Officer Benton stopped his taser short of a full five-second cycle. Robinson proceeded to climb up the fence, then onto the wall, where he lost his balance, fell, and died. Robinson's family tells a different story. In their version of events, Officer Benton fired his taser upward at Robinson while he was on top of the wall. The taser probes contacted Robinson with full effect, causing him to become temporarily incapacitated, fall, break his neck, and die. The plaintiffs point to substantial evidence that contradicts Officer Benton's account. First, several days after the incident, another officer investigating the shooting found a green blast door from a taser cartridge inside the complex, on the opposite side of the wall from where Officer Benton was standing when he fired his taser, suggesting that the taser had been fired upwards and over the wall. Second, several eyewitnesses from the nearby apartment complex testified that they saw Robinson fall. One witness testified that she heard a "pop" while Robinson was still visible on top of the wall. Another witness testified that he heard Robinson "yell \`help' three or four times" while on top of the wall. That witness testified that she saw Robinson sitting on the wall until "something occurred" and "\[h]is right arm went in the air" before he fell. A third witness said that he also heard Robinson call for help while sitting on the wall. He then saw Robinson "stiffen up" like "he went into shock" before falling over the wall into the apartment complex. Officer Benton testified that he was aware of and understood police department policy that a taser "will cause most everyone to fall and therefore should not be used when the risk of falling would likely result in death\[.]" He also agreed that under that policy it was "not appropriate" to use a taser "if someone is at an elevated height\[.]" Tracy Rucker, the master instructor on taser use for DeKalb County, testified that a person who is tased will experience "neuromuscular incapacitation" and will be paralyzed from pain for around five seconds. He also testified that he instructed DeKalb County officers that tasers could be deadly when the target is in a dangerous position such as an elevated height. And he affirmed that even a fall "from a level that's not that high" can cause serious injury when the victim has been incapacitated by a taser. ## Wilson v. City of Lafayette {% embed url="" %} [^1]: *Id.* at 396; [*Tanberg v. Sholtis,* 401 F.3d 1151, 1168 (10th Cir. 2005)](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3432191679078865230\&hl=en\&as_sdt=6,50) ("Under this objective standard, evidence tending to show Officer Sholtis's subjective state of mind is irrelevant."). --- # Agent Instructions This documentation is published with GitBook. GitBook is the documentation platform designed so that both humans and AI agents can read, navigate, and reason over technical content effectively. 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