> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://studies-de-jure.gitbook.io/learn/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://studies-de-jure.gitbook.io/learn/sourcebooks/criminal-procedure/investigative-detentions-terry-stops/cases-notes-and-questions/stuff-to-organize-terry-v.-ohio.md).

# Stuff to organize Terry v. Ohio

\* \* \*

The next case sheds further light on the permissible scope of investigatory stops based on reasonable suspicion. In particular, it helps to illustrate how long a person may be detained for a “*Terry* stop.”

Supreme Court of the United States

**United States v. William Harris Sharpe**

Decided March 20, 1985 – [470 U.S. 675](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/470/675/)

Chief Justice BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to decide whether an individual reasonably suspected of engaging in criminal activity may be detained for a period of 20 minutes, when the detention is necessary for law enforcement officers to conduct a limited investigation of the suspected criminal activity.

**I**

**A**

On the morning of June 9, 1978, Agent Cooke of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was on patrol in an unmarked vehicle on a coastal road near Sunset Beach, North Carolina, an area under surveillance for suspected drug trafficking. At approximately 6:30 a.m., Cooke noticed a blue pickup truck with an attached camper shell traveling on the highway in tandem with a blue Pontiac Bonneville. Respondent Savage was driving the pickup, and respondent Sharpe was driving the Pontiac. The Pontiac also carried a passenger, Davis, the charges against whom were later dropped. Observing that the truck was riding low in the rear and that the camper did not bounce or sway appreciably when the truck drove over bumps or around curves, Agent Cooke concluded that it was heavily loaded. A quilted material covered the rear and side windows of the camper.

Cooke’s suspicions were sufficiently aroused to follow the two vehicles for approximately 20 miles as they proceeded south into South Carolina. He then decided to make an “investigative stop” and radioed the State Highway Patrol for assistance. Officer Thrasher, driving a marked patrol car, responded to the call. Almost immediately after Thrasher caught up with the procession, the Pontiac and the pickup turned off the highway and onto a campground road. Cooke and Thrasher followed the two vehicles as the latter drove along the road at 55 to 60 miles an hour, exceeding the speed limit of 35 miles an hour. The road eventually looped back to the highway, onto which Savage and Sharpe turned and continued to drive south.

At this point, all four vehicles were in the middle lane of the three right-hand lanes of the highway. Agent Cooke asked Officer Thrasher to signal both vehicles to stop. Thrasher pulled alongside the Pontiac, which was in the lead, turned on his flashing light, and motioned for the driver of the Pontiac to stop. As Sharpe moved the Pontiac into the right lane, the pickup truck cut between the Pontiac and Thrasher’s patrol car, nearly hitting the patrol car, and continued down the highway. Thrasher pursued the truck while Cooke pulled up behind the Pontiac.

Cooke approached the Pontiac and identified himself. He requested identification, and Sharpe produced a Georgia driver’s license bearing the name of Raymond J. Pavlovich. Cooke then attempted to radio Thrasher to determine whether he had been successful in stopping the pickup truck, but he was unable to make contact for several minutes, apparently because Thrasher was not in his patrol car. Cooke radioed the local police for assistance, and two officers from the Myrtle Beach Police Department arrived about 10 minutes later. Asking the two officers to “maintain the situation,” Cooke left to join Thrasher.

In the meantime, Thrasher had stopped the pickup truck about one-half mile down the road. After stopping the truck, Thrasher had approached it with his revolver drawn, ordered the driver, Savage, to get out and assume a “spread eagled” position against the side of the truck, and patted him down. Thrasher then holstered his gun and asked Savage for his driver’s license and the truck’s vehicle registration. Savage produced his own Florida driver’s license and a bill of sale for the truck bearing the name of Pavlovich. In response to questions from Thrasher concerning the ownership of the truck, Savage said that the truck belonged to a friend and that he was taking it to have its shock absorbers repaired. When Thrasher told Savage that he would be held until the arrival of Cooke, whom Thrasher identified as a DEA agent, Savage became nervous, said that he wanted to leave, and requested the return of his driver’s license. Thrasher replied that Savage was not free to leave at that time.

Agent Cooke arrived at the scene approximately 15 minutes after the truck had been stopped. Thrasher handed Cooke Savage’s license and the bill of sale for the truck; Cooke noted that the bill of sale bore the same name as Sharpe’s license. Cooke identified himself to Savage as a DEA agent and said that he thought the truck was loaded with marihuana. Cooke twice sought permission to search the camper, but Savage declined to give it, explaining that he was not the owner of the truck. Cooke then stepped on the rear of the truck and, observing that it did not sink any lower, confirmed his suspicion that it was probably overloaded. He put his nose against the rear window, which was covered from the inside, and reported that he could smell marihuana. Without seeking Savage’s permission, Cooke removed the keys from the ignition, opened the rear of the camper, and observed a large number of burlap-wrapped bales resembling bales of marihuana that Cooke had seen in previous investigations. Agent Cooke then placed Savage under arrest and left him with Thrasher.

Cooke returned to the Pontiac and arrested Sharpe and Davis. Approximately 30 to 40 minutes had elapsed between the time Cooke stopped the Pontiac and the time he returned to arrest Sharpe and Davis. Cooke assembled the various parties and vehicles and led them to the Myrtle Beach police station. That evening, DEA agents took the truck to the Federal Building in Charleston, South Carolina. Several days later, Cooke supervised the unloading of the truck, which contained 43 bales weighing a total of 2,629 pounds. Acting without a search warrant, Cooke had eight randomly selected bales opened and sampled. Chemical tests showed that the samples were marihuana.

**B**

Sharpe and Savage were charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute it. The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied respondents’ motion to suppress the contraband, and respondents were convicted. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the convictions. We granted the petition, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case for further consideration. On remand, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals again reversed the convictions. We granted certiorari and we reverse.

**II**

The only issue in this case \[] is whether it was reasonable under the circumstances facing Agent Cooke and Officer Thrasher to detain Savage, whose vehicle contained the challenged evidence, for approximately 20 minutes.2 We conclude that the detention of Savage clearly meets the Fourth Amendment’s standard of reasonableness.

Obviously, if an investigative stop continues indefinitely, at some point it can no longer be justified as an investigative stop. But our cases impose no rigid time limitation on *Terry* stops. While it is clear that “the brevity of the invasion of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion,” we have emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes. Much as a “bright line” rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.

In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. A court making this assessment should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing. A creative judge engaged in *post hoc* evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have been accomplished. But “\[t]he fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by ‘less intrusive’ means does not, itself, render the search unreasonable.” The question is not simply whether some other alternative was available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or to pursue it.

We readily conclude that, given the circumstances facing him, Agent Cooke pursued his investigation in a diligent and reasonable manner. During most of Savage’s 20-minute detention, Cooke was attempting to contact Thrasher and enlisting the help of the local police who remained with Sharpe while Cooke left to pursue Officer Thrasher and the pickup. Once Cooke reached Officer Thrasher and Savage, he proceeded expeditiously: within the space of a few minutes, he examined Savage’s driver’s license and the truck’s bill of sale, requested (and was denied) permission to search the truck, stepped on the rear bumper and noted that the truck did not move, confirming his suspicion that it was probably overloaded. He then detected the odor of marihuana.

Clearly this case does not involve any delay unnecessary to the legitimate investigation of the law enforcement officers. Respondents presented no evidence that the officers were dilatory in their investigation. The delay in this case was attributable almost entirely to the evasive actions of Savage, who sought to elude the police as Sharpe moved his Pontiac to the side of the road. Except for Savage’s maneuvers, only a short and certainly permissible pre-arrest detention would likely have taken place. The somewhat longer detention was simply the result of a “graduate\[d] … respons\[e] to the demands of \[the] particular situation.”

We reject the contention that a 20-minute stop is unreasonable when the police have acted diligently and a suspect’s actions contribute to the added delay about which he complains. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

**Notes, Comments, and Questions**

The Court decided in *Illinois v. Caballes* (Chapter 5) that when a motorist is lawfully held for a traffic stop, police use of drug-sniffing dogs to investigate a vehicle is not a “search.” In *Rodriguez v. United States*, [135 S. Ct. 1609](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-9972_p8k0.pdf) (2015), the Court considered whether police may lengthen a traffic stop for the purpose of conducting such a dog sniff.

A police officer pulled over Dennys Rodriguez for driving on the shoulder of a Nebraska state highway, which is unlawful. During the stop, the officer asked Rodriguez why he had driven on the shoulder and, after receiving an answer, “gathered Rodriguez’s license, registration, and proof of insurance.” He then ran “a records check on Rodriguez” before returning to question Rodriguez and his passenger. Next, the officer returned to his car again, ran a records check on the passenger, and “began writing a warning ticket for Rodriguez for driving on the shoulder of the road.” Rodriguez made no objection to any of this conduct.

After writing the warning ticket and presenting it to Rodriguez (along with other documents the officer had collected during the stop), the officer asked Rodriguez for permission to walk a drug dog around Rodriguez’s vehicle. Rodriguez declined, and the officer ordered Rodriguez to stay put, which he did. The officer brought the dog, and when the dog “alerted to the presence of drugs,” the officer searched the car and found “a large bag of methamphetamine.” Rodriguez was eventually convicted of “possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine.”

Rodriguez argued that the officer impermissibly extended the traffic stop—after it was essentially finished—so that he could conduct the dog sniff. Rodriguez argued further that the extension constituted an unlawful seizure. The Court agreed.

In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court wrote:

“A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation. ‘\[A] relatively brief encounter,’ a routine traffic stop is ‘more analogous to a so-called “*Terry* stop” … than to a formal arrest.’ Like a *Terry* stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns. Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may ‘last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th\[at] purpose.’ Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.”

The Court wrote that while activities related to traffic enforcement—such as checking a driver’s license and registration—are permissible parts of a traffic stop, “\[a] dog sniff, by contrast, is a measure aimed at ‘detect\[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.’ Candidly, the Government acknowledged at oral argument that a dog sniff, unlike the routine measures just mentioned, is not an ordinary incident of a traffic stop. Lacking the same close connection to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries, a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the officer’s traffic mission.”

The Court rejected the prosecution’s argument that so long as the total length of the stop remains reasonable, an officer may extend it to conduct a dog sniff.

“The Government argues that an officer may ‘incremental\[ly]’ prolong a stop to conduct a dog sniff so long as the officer is reasonably diligent in pursuing the traffic-related purpose of the stop, and the overall duration of the stop remains reasonable in relation to the duration of other traffic stops involving similar circumstances. The Government’s argument, in effect, is that by completing all traffic-related tasks expeditiously, an officer can earn bonus time to pursue an unrelated criminal investigation. The reasonableness of a seizure, however, depends on what the police in fact do. In this regard, the Government acknowledges that ‘an officer always has to be reasonably diligent.’ How could diligence be gauged other than by noting what the officer actually did and how he did it? If an officer can complete traffic-based inquiries expeditiously, then that is the amount of ‘time reasonably required to complete \[the stop’s] mission.’ \[A] traffic stop ‘prolonged beyond’ that point is ‘unlawful.’ The critical question, then, is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket but whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—*i.e.,* adds time to—‘the stop.’”

In his dissent, Justice Alito first argued that the Court should have avoided the constitutional question decided in the case because “the police officer *did have* reasonable suspicion \[of illegal drug activity], and, as a result, the officer was justified in detaining the occupants for the short period of time (seven or eight minutes) that is at issue.”3 Then, he argued that the Court’s holding was baseless and impractical, suggesting that officers will delay completing the permitted activities of a traffic stop if they wish to conduct dog sniffs.

“The Court refuses to address the real Fourth Amendment question: whether the stop was unreasonably prolonged. Instead, the Court latches onto the fact that Officer Struble delivered the warning prior to the dog sniff and proclaims that the authority to detain based on a traffic stop ends when a citation or warning is handed over to the driver. The Court thus holds that the Fourth Amendment was violated, not because of the length of the stop, but simply because of the sequence in which Officer Struble chose to perform his tasks.”

“The rule that the Court adopts will do little good going forward. It is unlikely to have any appreciable effect on the length of future traffic stops. Most officers will learn the prescribed sequence of events even if they cannot fathom the reason for that requirement.”

The next case concerns whether during a *Terry* stop, police may demand that a suspect identify himself, under threat of prosecution if the suspect does not comply.

Supreme Court of the United States

**Larry D. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada**

Decided June 21, 2004 – [542 U.S. 177](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/542/177/)

Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner was arrested and convicted for refusing to identify himself during a stop allowed by *Terry v. Ohio*. He challenges his conviction under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.

**I**

The sheriff’s department in Humboldt County, Nevada, received an afternoon telephone call reporting an assault. The caller reported seeing a man assault a woman in a red and silver GMC truck on Grass Valley Road. Deputy Sheriff Lee Dove was dispatched to investigate. When the officer arrived at the scene, he found the truck parked on the side of the road. A man was standing by the truck, and a young woman was sitting inside it. The officer observed skid marks in the gravel behind the vehicle, leading him to believe it had come to a sudden stop.

The officer approached the man and explained that he was investigating a report of a fight. The man appeared to be intoxicated. The officer asked him if he had “any identification on \[him],” which we understand as a request to produce a driver’s license or some other form of written identification. The man refused and asked why the officer wanted to see identification. The officer responded that he was conducting an investigation and needed to see some identification. The unidentified man became agitated and insisted he had done nothing wrong. The officer explained that he wanted to find out who the man was and what he was doing there. After continued refusals to comply with the officer’s request for identification, the man began to taunt the officer by placing his hands behind his back and telling the officer to arrest him and take him to jail. This routine kept up for several minutes: The officer asked for identification 11 times and was refused each time. After warning the man that he would be arrested if he continued to refuse to comply, the officer placed him under arrest.

We now know that the man arrested on Grass Valley Road is Larry Dudley Hiibel. Hiibel was charged with “willfully resist\[ing], delay\[ing] or obstruct\[ing] a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any legal duty of his office.” The government reasoned that Hiibel had obstructed the officer in carrying out his duties under § 171.123, a Nevada statute that defines the legal rights and duties of a police officer in the context of an investigative stop. Section 171.123 provides in relevant part:

“1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer encounters under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime.

….

“3. The officer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to ascertain his identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his presence abroad. Any person so detained shall identify himself, but may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer.”

Hiibel was tried in the Justice Court of Union Township. The court agreed that Hiibel’s refusal to identify himself as required by \[Nevada Law] “obstructed and delayed Dove as a public officer in attempting to discharge his duty.” Hiibel was convicted and fined $250. The Sixth Judicial District Court affirmed. On review the Supreme Court of Nevada rejected the Fourth Amendment challenge in a divided opinion. We granted certiorari.

**II**

NRS § 171.123(3) is an enactment sometimes referred to as a “stop and identify” statute. Stop and identify statutes often combine elements of traditional vagrancy laws with provisions intended to regulate police behavior in the course of investigatory stops. The statutes vary from State to State, but all permit an officer to ask or require a suspect to disclose his identity.

Stop and identify statutes have their roots in early English vagrancy laws that required suspected vagrants to face arrest unless they gave “a good Account of themselves.” The Court has recognized \[] constitutional limitations on the scope and operation of stop and identify statutes. In *Brown v. Texas*, \[[443 U.S. 47](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/443/47/) (1979)] the Court invalidated a conviction for violating a Texas stop and identify statute on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Court ruled that the initial stop was not based on specific, objective facts establishing reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect was involved in criminal activity. Four Terms later, the Court invalidated a modified stop and identify statute on vagueness grounds. Th\[at] law \[] required a suspect to give an officer “‘credible and reliable’” identification when asked to identify himself. The Court held that the statute was void because it provided no standard for determining what a suspect must do to comply with it, resulting in “‘virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation.’”

The present case begins where our prior cases left off. Here there is no question that the initial stop was based on reasonable suspicion, satisfying the Fourth Amendment requirements noted in *Brown.* As we understand it, the statute does not require a suspect to give the officer a driver’s license or any other document. Provided that the suspect either states his name or communicates it to the officer by other means—a choice, we assume, that the suspect may make—the statute is satisfied and no violation occurs.

**III**

Hiibel argues that his conviction cannot stand because the officer’s conduct violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We disagree.

Asking questions is an essential part of police investigations. In the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment. “\[I]nterrogation relating to one’s identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.” Beginning with *Terry v. Ohio*, the Court has recognized that a law enforcement officer’s reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate further. To ensure that the resulting seizure is constitutionally reasonable, a *Terry* stop must be limited. The officer’s action must be “‘justified at its inception, and … reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’”

Our decisions make clear that questions concerning a suspect’s identity are a routine and accepted part of many *Terry* stops. Obtaining a suspect’s name in the course of a *Terry* stop serves important government interests. Knowledge of identity may inform an officer that a suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of violence or mental disorder. On the other hand, knowing identity may help clear a suspect and allow the police to concentrate their efforts elsewhere. Identity may prove particularly important in cases such as this, where the police are investigating what appears to be a domestic assault. Officers called to investigate domestic disputes need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim.

Although it is well established that an officer may ask a suspect to identify himself in the course of a *Terry* stop, it has been an open question whether the suspect can be arrested and prosecuted for refusal to answer. \[T]he Fourth Amendment does not impose obligations on the citizen but instead provides rights against the government. As a result, the Fourth Amendment itself cannot require a suspect to answer questions. This case concerns a different issue, however. Here, the source of the legal obligation arises from Nevada state law, not the Fourth Amendment. Further, the statutory obligation does not go beyond answering an officer’s request to disclose a name.

The principles of *Terry* permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a *Terry* stop. The reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment is determined “by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate government interests.” The Nevada statute satisfies that standard. The request for identity has an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a *Terry* stop. The threat of criminal sanction helps ensure that the request for identity does not become a legal nullity. On the other hand, the Nevada statute does not alter the nature of the stop itself: it does not change its duration or its location. A state law requiring a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a valid *Terry* stop is consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.

It is clear in this case that the request for identification was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified” the stop. The officer’s request was a commonsense inquiry, not an effort to obtain an arrest for failure to identify after a *Terry* stop yielded insufficient evidence. The stop, the request, and the State’s requirement of a response did not contravene the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment.

The judgment of the Nevada Supreme Court is \[a]ffirmed*.*

Justice BREYER, with whom Justice SOUTER and Justice GINSBURG join, dissenting.

\[T]his Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents make clear that police may conduct a *Terry* stop only within circumscribed limits. And one of those limits invalidates laws that compel responses to police questioning.

In *Terry v. Ohio*, the Court considered whether police, in the absence of probable cause, can stop, question, or frisk an individual at all. The Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects the “‘right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person.’” At the same time, it recognized that in certain circumstances, public safety might require a limited “seizure,” or stop, of an individual against his will. The Court consequently set forth conditions circumscribing when and how the police might conduct a *Terry* stop. They include what has become known as the “reasonable suspicion” standard. Justice White, in a separate concurring opinion, set forth further conditions. Justice White wrote: “Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued observation.”

About 10 years later, the Court, in *Brown v. Texas,* held that police lacked “any reasonable suspicion” to detain the particular petitioner and require him to identify himself. Then, five years later, the Court wrote that an “officer may ask the \[*Terry*] detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions. *But the detainee is not obliged to respond.*” *Berkemer v. McCarty,* \[[468 U.S. 420](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/468/420/) (1984)].

This lengthy history—of concurring opinions, of references, and of clear explicit statements—means that the Court’s statement in *Berkemer,* while technically dicta, is the kind of strong dicta that the legal community typically takes as a statement of the law. And that law has remained undisturbed for more than 20 years. There is no good reason now to reject this generation-old statement of the law.

The majority presents no evidence that the rule enunciated by Justice White and then by the *Berkemer* Court, which for nearly a generation has set forth a settled *Terry* stop condition, has significantly interfered with law enforcement. Nor has the majority presented any other convincing justification for change. I would not begin to erode a clear rule with special exceptions.

I consequently dissent.

**Notes, Comments, and Questions**

#### Perceptions of Stop-and-Frisk

In *Terry v. Ohio*, the majority wrote, “When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.” The Court held that the “reasonable suspicion” standard struck a sensible compromise between individual liberty and law enforcement realities.

In dissent, Justice Douglas warned, “To give the police greater power than a magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitarian path.” He argued that “if the individual is no longer to be sovereign, if the police can pick him up whenever they do not like the cut of his jib, if they can ‘seize’ and ‘search’ him in their discretion, we enter a new regime. The decision to enter it should be made only after a full debate by the people of this country.”

In the subsequent half century, the debate over stop-and-frisk tactics has remained heated. Opponents of the practice have argued that it visits humiliation on suspects for limited benefit and that police apply the tactic in a racially biased manner. For example, a federal court in New York found that the NYPD unconstitutionally focused disproportionately on Black and Hispanic suspects when stopping and frisking New Yorkers. *See Floyd v. City of New York*, [959 F. Supp. 2d 540](https://casetext.com/case/floyd-v-city-of-ny-2) (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit initially stayed the ruling of the district court pending appeal, but the city dropped the appeal after the election of a mayor who [campaigned on a promise](https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/nyregion/de-blasio-stop-and-frisk.html) to comply with the district court. *See* J. David Goodman, “[De Blasio Drops Challenge to Law on Police Profiling](https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/nyregion/de-blasio-drops-challenge-to-law-on-police-profiling.html),” N.Y. Times (March 5, 2014).

The case in favor of stop-and-frisk was articulated by Heidi Grossman, New York City’s lead attorney in the *Floyd* trial. She said, “Our defense is that we go to where the crime is. And once we go to where the crime is, we have our police officers keep their eyes open, make observations; and only when they make observations, do they go and make reasonable suspicion stops.” She added that when police conduct stop-and-frisk in areas with high minority populations, “the majority of victims are black and Hispanics in the area. They are begging for help, and they want to be able to walk to and from work in a safe way. And so it is incumbent upon us to have our officers go out there and do their job, and keep the city safe.” *See* “[The Argument for Stop-and-Frisk](https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=186023458?storyId=186023458),” NPR (May 22, 2013).

For the perspective of some New Yorkers who have been repeatedly stopped and frisked and find the experience intensely unpleasant, *see* Julie Dressner & Edwin Martinez, Op-Doc: Season 1, “[The Scars of Stop-and-Frisk,](https://www.nytimes.com/video/opinion/100000001601732/the-scars-of-stop-and-frisk.html)” N.Y. Times (June 12, 2012); Ross Tuttle & Erin Schneider, “[Stopped-and-Frisked: ‘For Being a F\*\*king Mutt](https://www.thenation.com/article/stopped-and-frisked-being-fking-mutt-video/),’” The Nation (Oct. 8, 2012) *(*secret recording by teen of himself being stopped, along with interview of anonymous police officer about department practices).

What are the best (most convincing) arguments in favor of allowing police to stop and frisk suspects without probable cause?

## ???

<details>

<summary>Attributions and Licensing</summary>

Except as otherwise ... This edited version of *Terry v. Ohio* is adapted from [2.19: Chapter 20 - Stop and Frisk](https://biz.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Criminal_Law/Criminal_Procedure%3A_A_Free_Law_School_Casebook_2e_\(Alexander_and_Trachtenberg\)/02%3A_The_Fourth_Amendment/2.19%3A_Chapter_20_-_Stop_and_Frisk) in [*Criminal Procedure: A Free Law School Casebook 2e*](https://biz.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Criminal_Law/Criminal_Procedure%3A_A_Free_Law_School_Casebook_2e_\(Alexander_and_Trachtenberg\)) by [Anne M Alexander](https://law.missouri.edu/directory/anne-alexander/) and [Ben Trachtenberg](https://law.missouri.edu/directory/ben-trachtenberg/), used under [CC BY-NC-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/). This page is licensed under [CC BY-NC-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/).

</details>


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