Annotated Case Brief: Malley v. Briggs

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986)

Relevant Facts

Hint: Remember, what you write here shouldn't be finalized until you have examined both the facts in the statement of facts and additional facts that may pop up during the court's discussion.

Malley, a state trooper, was investigating Paul Driscoll for drug-related activities. Based on intercepted phone calls, Malley believed a party involving drugs took place at the home of the Briggs and others. Malley prepared felony complaints and supporting affidavits for an arrest warrant, which a judge approved. The charges were later dropped as the grand jury did not return an indictment.

Briggs sued Malley under 42 U.S. C. § 1983, alleging he was arrested unconstitutionally. The trial court entered a directed verdict in Malley's favor, reasoning that the judge's signature on the warrant protected Malley from issuing a warrant lacking probable cause and that Malley's good-faith belief that probable cause existed provided Malley qualified immunity from personal liability.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, reasoning that qualified immunity only applies if Malley's belief about probable cause existing was objectively reasonable (as opposed to the subjective "good-faith" standard).

Issue(s)

What is the degree of immunity afforded a defendant police officer in a damages action under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 when it is alleged that the officer caused the plaintiffs to be unconstitutionally arrested by presenting a judge with a complaint and a supporting affidavit which failed to establish probable cause?

The court's framing of the issue

A couple of things to note here. In the first paragraph of the case, the court starts out telling the reader what the issue is, which is convenient. However, it is slightly misleading because the question's phrasing is a little too broad. At the beginning of part II, the court observes that in this case, the issue is not only what degree of immunity but also when absolute or qualified immunity applies, and it notes that neither degree of immunity protects the officer in this case).

Holding

Reversed.

Neither absolute nor qualified immunity exists where the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render the belief in its existence unreasonable. This officer (petitioner) is not entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity.

An officer's good-faith belief that probable cause exists is insufficient to justify immunity; whether a judge signs the warrant is irrelevant to whether an officer is entitled to immunity.

Rules

Hint: These next two points come from part II.A.

• Qualified immunity from personal liability is the norm for executive officers, generally.

• For a state officer to have absolute immunity from personal liability for constitutional violations must show that public policy favors absolute (versus qualified immunity).

Observation about part II.B of the opinion

Part II.B starts with a lengthy history lesson, and not all of it is relevant to this brief. For novice case briefers, it can take a little practice to extract the crucial parts. Hopefully, this can help see the thinking process for figuring out this section.

The first sentence about false arrests and police officers (i.e., about what the court has previously held) is relevant to the brief, but most of the back and forth about the petitioner's argument isn't helpful to the brief, per se. There is still a basic history lesson, but the court distills the rule(s) from part II.B at the end of the second paragraph.

• At common law, police officers have qualified immunity (from personal liability) for false arrests when sued under § 1983.

• Qualified immunity will not apply (thus, there is no immunity) when no reasonably competent officer could have concluded that a warrant should issue; but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree, there should be immunity.

Reminder and clarification about the previous bullet

In the previous point—this should be review for students in the course— when the court references whether "a warrant should issue, it is referring to the existence of probable cause, based on the 4th Amendment.

Also, to be clear, when the court says "there should be immunity" when reasonably competent officers could (reasonably) disagree, it is referring to qualified immunity.

• In the criminal procedural context, absolute immunity relating to § 1983 suits requires that the subject's function or actions be intimately associated with the judicial phase of the process. The point (i.e., the public policy) is that without absolute immunity, the integrity of the judicial process would be impaired.

Note about the previous bullet

The court's point here is that the principal role of prosecutorial functions is intimately associated with the judicial process. Initiating the criminal process (such as seeking an indictment or filing a criminal complaint or information) is intimately associated with the judicial process.

However, it should be noted that there are limitations to absolute immunity when the prosecutor's actions are not functionally tied to the judicial phase of the criminal process. For this reason, giving legal advice to the police is not eligible for absolute immunity.[*] Another example is that absolute immunity does not apply to a prosecutor performing investigative functions that are of the type normally performed by law enforcement personnel, such as forming probable cause by the collection of evidence.[*] This lack of absolute immunity for prosecutors is also true of statements in press conferences or press releases to the media that contain false and prejudicial information; communicating to the media is not functionally tied to the judicial process.[*]

Analysis

• Public policy does not favor absolute immunity for officers applying for warrants. Qualified immunity protects officers who are not plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. Thus, affording immunity based on the objective reasonableness of an officer's actions sufficiently furthers the public policy goal of avoiding excessive disruption of government and permitting the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.

  • Therefore: Objectively, if no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that probable cause exists to support a warrant, then the officer should not receive immunity. If reasonable minds could differ, however, the officer should receive immunity.

• Since absolute immunity is afforded to those whose functions or actions are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, officers applying for a warrant are not analogous to prosecutors—who are generally entitled to absolute immunity—initiating a prosecution, such as through an indictment. Removing absolute immunity from the process of seeking a conviction (i.e., the role of a prosecutor) could impair the exercise of independent judgment and the performance of a central actor in the judicial process.

  • Applying for a warrant is too removed from the judicial phase of criminal proceedings to be entitled to absolute immunity. Applying for a warrant impacts the investigatory functions of law enforcement, but it is not part of the judicial phase of criminal proceedings.

• Public policy further supports only qualified immunity for officers; it should force them to reflect on the reasonableness of their actions before prematurely wasting judicial resources, injuring the innocent, and providing additional reasons for guilty parties to go free through the suppression of improperly obtained evidence.

• Public policy supports keeping standards of policy conduct consistent between acts that subject them to personal liability and those that lead to the suppression of evidence based on unconstitutional acts. Reasonableness is the standard of whether evidence is suppressed, so it should be the same for unconstitutional actions against those who may be innocent.

  • An officer's good-faith belief (i.e., a subjective belief) that probable cause exists is insufficient. It would allow officers to hide behind their actions on the basis that a judge signed the warrant. This is not good public policy because, in reality, judges have time pressures that may prevent them from thoroughly assessing the existence of probable cause. Officers are in the best place to assess probable cause for the purposes of a warrant; they are the most closely familiar with the facts

Notes about the previous bullet

First, although the court doesn't expressly state what "perform[ing] as a magistrate should" means, it is referring to the "docket pressures" being such that limited time frames may impede the judge's ability to thoroughly assess probable cause from the warrant application.

Second, pragmatically, after arrest, the first time a genuinely thorough assessment of probable cause can be performed will be either (a) during grand jury proceedings or (b) at the preliminary hearing/examination in cases in which there is no grand jury. Although it is true that probable cause is evaluated at the defendant's initial appearance before a judge after arrest, this determination is perfunctory and based largely on the information/evidence that law enforcement has presented to the prosecutor. So, the probable cause determination at the initial appearance is not necessarily a meaningful "safety valve" to protect against a defendant's unconstitutional detention.

A final observation: With law enforcement being in the best position to know whether probable cause exists, they are also in the best position to protect citizens' constitutional liberties by acting as a reasonably competent officer would (i.e., an officer who is well-trained and reasonable).

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